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In June of 1999 a CDC panel of experts in medicine, public health,
military intelligence and law enforcement evaluated the biological
agents listed below and ranked them according to a matrix analysis.
Category A contains
agents that were considered the greatest threat in terms of causing
casualties and in terms of the need for stockpiling antibiotics and
vaccines.
Category B agents
were considered to have potential for transmission and illness, but
with fewer requirements for public health action.
Category C agents
were those considered as possible emerging public health threats.
CATEGORY A |
BIOLOGICAL AGENT |
DISEASE | |
Variola Major |
Smallpox | |
Bacillus Anthracis |
Anthrax | |
Yersinia Pestis |
Plague |
Botulinum Toxin
(Clostridium Botulinum) |
Botulism | |
Francisella Tularensis |
Tularemia |
Filoviruses/Arenaviruses
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Hemorrhagic Fever | |
|
CATEGORY B |
BIOLOGICAL AGENT |
DISEASE | |
Coxiella Burnetii |
Q Fever | |
Brucella Species |
Brucellosis | |
Burkholderia Mallei |
Glanders | |
Burkholderia Pseudomallei |
Melsosdosis | |
Alphaviruses |
Viral Encephalitis | |
Rickettsia Prowazekii |
Typhus | |
Toxins (Ricin, Epsilon, Toxin of Clostridium,
Perfringens, Stephylococcal Enterotoxin B) |
Toxin Syndrome | |
Chlamydia Psittaci |
Psittacosis | |
Foodborne Disease Agents | |
Foodborne Disease Agents
Top ^ | | |
CATEGORY C |
Any agent identified by the CDC Emerging Infectious
Diseases program, such as Nipah virus, Hantavirus, and
tick-borne Hemorrhagic Fevers.
Top ^ |
Source: Living Terrors by Micheal Osterholm, & John
Schwartz; Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
Critical Biological Agents for Public Health
Preparedness, 1999 |
SMALLPOX
Smallpox, the nightmare to end all nightmares that was eliminated as
a natural disease in the 1970s, often starts with a simple fever—the
sort of thing anyone might get. The disease has a relatively long
incubation period (the time from exposure to first symptoms). If you
were unlucky enough to be exposed to the virus, it would take about
twelve days for those first signs of fever, headache, and malaise to
appear. Next a red rash will appear in your mouth, throat, and on
the face; soon after that it appears on the arms, legs, and torso.
At first the rash doesn’t look like much and can be mistaken for
chickenpox. A trained health care worker could detect important
differences, but it takes a special kind of person — the kind who,
when the sound of galloping horses nears, considers that it might
possibly be a herd of zebras. Soon the horror begins. The pocks
bullet-like, pus-filled blisters — begin to appear on the skin. As
you enter this stage, you’re likely in agony; people have compared
it to having their skin on fire. At this point, you’ve been highly
infectious for several days, and for another week your body will
keep pumping out virus particles with every breath, infecting your
loved ones, your doctors, and anyone else unfortunate enough to come
near. Only after several days of rash and the appearance of pocks is
a physician likely to consider smallpox. Even then, that will
probably only happen if the doctor is old enough to have seen it or
has had sufficient training in biological agents.
The disease is caused by the variola virus. It is a naturally
occurring disease that spreads from person to person through
airborne respiratory droplets, or aerosols. If you’re thinking
you’re immune, you’re probably mistaken. Vaccinations ceased in the
l970s, so today’s under-thirty population has no immunity; what’s
worse, many of the people who were vaccinated thirty or more years
ago have lost or reduced their immunity as their vaccinations wore
off. That leaves you unprotected, or with limited protection,
against a disease that kills one in three victims. And if you do
recover, you’ll bear the disfiguring pockmark scars for the rest of
your days. There is no cure for smallpox; although the chance of
survival in a limited number of cases could possibly be improved by
a currently available antiviral drug, it is difficult to use and in
short supply. Few people in the world can even remember smallpox:
it’s been more than fifty years since the last case occurred in the
United States, and the last naturally occurring case in the world
was reported in Somalia in October 1977. Since that time, it has
been assumed that mankind’s worst scourge was over. However,
with the revelations that Russia, Iraq, and North Korea harbor
undeclared stocks of smallpox virus, we must once again consider the
possibility of its return. To put smallpox into perspective, one
only need look at what disease and death it caused throughout the
world in the twentieth century. The world’s population was much
smaller, of course, through most of this century— 1.6 billion people
in 1900, compared to 6 billion in 1999—and smallpox was
substantially reduced in most of the developed world by the 1940s.
Still, despite its relative rarity through much of the century in so
many areas of the world, approximately 500 million people died of
smallpox in the century that just ended. This compares with 320
million deaths during the same period as a result of all military
and civilian casualties of war, cases of swine flu during the
ruinous 1918 pandemic, and all cases of AIDS worldwide. These
staggering numbers make painfully clear how grave a global crisis
any return of smallpox would represent; the use of it as a weapon
would constitute the ultimate crime against humanity.
If a case of smallpox were actually identified, everyone who had
come in contact with that patient would have to be vaccinated
immediately to reduce the risk of additional cases. But as we will
see in later chapters, the supplies of vaccine have dwindled to 15.4
million doses in the United States inventory, which is held by the
CDC. Of note, the CDC has come up with the 15.4 million estimate;
other experts seriously doubt if we could get 7 to 8 million doses
out of our current stockpile. Either number may seem like a lot of
doses, but the number is deceptive: during a relatively small 1972
outbreak in Yugoslavia, that nation of 21 million people required 18
million doses of the vaccine in only ten days.
Currently, the smallpox vaccine in our inventory as well as around
the world is primarily derived from the old process of scarification
of calves — scratching the virus vaccinia (not smallpox, but cowpox)
into the skin of a calf and harvesting the subsequent infection.
Most of our severely limited vaccine supply is more than twenty-five
years old. For safety reasons, we can no longer use a live cow-pox
vaccine, which is essentially “cleaned up” cow pus. Even though in
early 2000 the federal government has finally initiated activities
to develop and produce a new vaccine from cell cultures, it will be
years before new and sufficient vaccine is available. If an actual
release of smallpox (whether intentionally or by accident) were to
lead to an epidemic, only early detection, isolation of the infected
individuals, surveillance of their contacts, and a focused selective
vaccination program wi11 allow us to regain control.
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^
ANTHRAX
Anthrax is a brilliantly
efficient killer. Most people who come by the disease naturally have
been exposed to infected animals — eating contaminated meat or
handling the skins or wool of infected animals. The bacteria can
enter the body through ingestion — that is, eating the contaminated
meat — or through contact with broken skin, which develops into what
is called wool-sorter’s disease. When it enters through the skin,
antibiotics are often sufficient to bring about a full recovery.
Breathing the bacteria into your lungs, however, causes a different
form of the disease: inhalational anthrax. This is the most
deadly form, and the most likely one that a terrorist would try to
exploit. If you breathed the spores into your lungs, you would
probably be ill within two to ten days — but your body could hold
off showing signs of illness for the next six to seven weeks. ‘When
it does hit you, it’s swift and ruthless. As the bacteria grow in
the lymph nodes of your chest, early symptoms mimic many common flu
like illnesses. By the time you’ve got a full-blown case and get a
proper diagnosis, antibiotics and intensive medical care are
unlikely to help. If you’re like most patients, you’ll be dead
within twenty-four to seventy-two hours from overwhelming infection
and shock caused by toxins that the bacterium produces.
There is substantial evidence that antibiotic treatment and use of
anthrax vaccine after exposure but before symptoms can greatly
reduce both the number of illnesses and the number of deaths. This
creates other problems, however, since a bioterrorism release will
likely involve far more people than our current supplies of both
could help. If there is any good news about anthrax at all, it’s
that there is no evidence that the disease can be passed from person
to person. Still, Bacillus anthracis, the agent that causes anthrax,
is the most serious of the bacterial threats that we face because it
is the likeliest one to be used. Easier to get and grow than
smallpox, it is the biological agent that the Soviets, the Iraqis,
and even the United States (in the 1960s) gave a high priority to
for “weaponization,” or turning into a weapon.
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^
PLAGUE
As its historical name
implies, plague is a disease that has evoked panic and fear in
populations dating back to our earliest history. People usually
contract the disease, caused by Yersinia Pestis, after being bitten
by an infected flea. The bite leads to bubonic plague, with
distinctly swollen and painful lymph nodes —the “buboes” that give
the disease its name. Appropriate and timely treatment with
antibiotics can cure this form of the disease. Those who have
developed biological weapons, however, have generally chosen a more
direct and potent route: inhaled aerosol.
One to six days after you breathe in the microbe, you are likely to
develop the especially virulent form, pneumonic plague. If you don’t
get treatment, you will quickly slide into kidney and respiratory
failure and subsequent shock followed most likely by death. Although
there is no available vaccine for plague, rapid use of antibiotics
for those likely to have been exposed to the aerosol of plague or to
cases of pneumonic plague is crucial. As with anthrax, the
difficulty of getting adequate supplies of antibiotics to the
victims in time to help them is daunting. Unlike anthrax, however,
plague has been shown to pass from person to person. It’s not nearly
as contagious as smallpox, but an attack would certainly affect more
people than those caught up in the initial exposure.
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^
BOTULINUM TOXIN
Botulism is typically a
food borne ailment caused by the toxins of Clostridium Botulinum.
Ingesting the tiniest amounts usually leads, twenty-four to
thirty-six hours later, to blurred vision and difficulty in
swallowing and speaking. Depending on the severity of exposure — and
ingesting minuscule amounts of the toxin can have direct results —
the symptoms may progress to general weakness, respiratory failure,
and death.
In a large outbreak, all you can hope for is that your community has
enough respirators available to keep you alive when your own useless
muscles can’t do the breathing for you. Of course, that’s not the
case in any city in the United States today.
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^
TULAREMIA
There are a few forms of
the bacterial disease tularemia, but the only one likely to be used
as a weapon is the inhaled, or typhoidal, variety. It causes you to
develop fever, chills, headache, and general weakness, as well as
chest pain, weight loss, and a nonproductive cough. It kills an
estimated 35 percent of its victims. The effects come on quite
quickly, usually within three to five days. An especially hardy bug
— it resists freezing and can remain viable for weeks in water —
tularemia was cultivated for weapons use by the United States in the
1950s and 1960s, by the Soviet Union, and by other nations as well.
It can be treated with certain antibiotics. However, as with the
case of an outbreak of anthrax or plague, if you came down with
tularemia you would desperately need antibiotics — and supplies of
those drugs aren’t adequate to ward off the effects of a large-scale
attack.
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^
HEMORRHAGIC FEVERS
Hemorrhagic fevers are
the horrifying diseases described in books like Richard Preston’s
The Hot Zone: ailments that cause the body’s fluids to leak out of
tissues and orifices and cause particularly gruesome deaths. These
viruses kill an estimated 30 to 90 percent of their victims. The
most famous of these, the filovirus Ebola, has been known since 1976
but has never been seen in the United States. Its effects come on
fairly quickly, usually within three to five days. It can be treated
with some antiviral drugs —which, however, like key antibiotics,
aren’t available in large amounts.
Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult flew to Zaire in hopes of finding
samples to turn into biological weapons. They apparently were
unsuccessful in finding the elusive virus. Another viral hemorrhagic
fever, Marburg has been associated with an outbreak in Germany and
Yugoslavia that infected thirty-one people. According to former
Soviet bioweapons official Kenneth Alibek, the Soviets tested
Marburg extensively and based their weapon version on a strain that
killed a scientist in a laboratory accident. The category also
includes yellow fever, Lassa fever, dengue, and more. Some of these
diseases respond to antiviral drugs, but these drugs are in short
supply and would not be available for large populations of victims.
Top
^
All excerpts taken from Living Terrors (What America Needs To
Know...) by Micheal Osterholm, & John Schwartz.
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